Before the first watershed. Of the six balances: 1 tipping, 5 not assessed. Position 15 of 100, set by judgment: the balances are recorded but do not move it.
- Biological degradation Tipping Does this tool damage the living world, or the body, faster than either can recover? Tipping: the tool has begun to cause this problem, without going past the limit.
- Radical monopoly Not assessed Can people still meet the need another way, without this tool? Not assessed: nobody has looked at this yet, so it is not counted as holding.
- Overprogramming Not assessed Does using this tool require training or certification that people cannot give each other? Not assessed: nobody has looked at this yet, so it is not counted as holding.
- Polarization Not assessed Does this tool move power or advantage to a few, at others’ cost? Not assessed: nobody has looked at this yet, so it is not counted as holding.
- Obsolescence Not assessed Does this tool force people to replace what still works? Not assessed: nobody has looked at this yet, so it is not counted as holding.
- Frustration Not assessed Does this tool give back less than it takes, counting everything it takes? Not assessed: nobody has looked at this yet, so it is not counted as holding.

What it does
Captures carbon dioxide from power plants, gas processing, and industry, and stores it underground or uses it to recover more oil.
Where it stops
Short of its own targets. Most flagship projects have captured far less than promised.
How easily you can stop using it
It is not a tool individuals use. Communities and governments decide whether to fund it.
What is scored
- The unit: Capturing carbon dioxide at power plants, gas processing plants, and factories, and storing it underground or using it to recover more oil. Left out: capturing carbon directly from the air.
- The job it is tested against: Capturing the share of emissions its projects promise. Ten of the thirteen flagship projects reviewed did not, which is why the record sits below the first watershed.
- Where and when: The thirteen projects reviewed by the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis in 2022. One of the six balances is assessed.
Most records in the catalogue sit in the convivial range or past the second watershed. This one sits below the first: a tool that cannot yet do reliably what it claims to do. Illich’s example of that zone is medicine before about 1913.
What the evidence says
In 2022 the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis reviewed 13 flagship carbon capture projects, together accounting for about 55% of the world’s operating capacity. Seven underperformed, two failed, and one was mothballed. Saskatchewan’s Boundary Dam and Australia’s Gorgon each fell about 50% short of their capture targets. The review also found that of the world’s roughly 39 million tonnes a year of capture capacity, about 28 million tonnes goes into oil fields to recover more oil.
What Illich saw
Illich did not write about carbon capture, which came later. His argument in Energy and Equity bears on it all the same: “The energy crisis cannot be overwhelmed by more energy inputs. It can only be dissolved, along with the illusion that well-being depends on the number of energy slaves a man has at his command.”1 Carbon capture promises to keep the energy flowing and clean up afterwards. The connection is our reading, not his.
Where the threshold falls
Below the first watershed, at 15. Ten of thirteen flagship projects did not do what they were built to do. Placed by judgment, as How to evaluate tools asks for tools that do not yet work. If the oil-recovery use is counted as what the tool actually does, the record may belong somewhere else altogether: see “Judge a tool by what it does.”
The six balances
This record sits below the first watershed, so these scores do not move its position. They are recorded because a tool that does not work can still do harm. Scored as set out in How we evaluate tools; one of the six balances has been assessed.
- Biological degradation: 1. Of about 39 million tonnes a year of capture capacity, about 28 million goes into oil fields to recover more oil.2 Capture also costs energy: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimated in 2005 that a power plant with capture needs roughly 10 to 40% more energy than one of the same output without it. Whether the two together make this balance lost is not yet judged.
- Radical monopoly: Not assessed.
- Overprogramming: Not assessed.
- Polarization: Not assessed.
- Obsolescence: Not assessed.
- Frustration: Not assessed. The public money spent against what was captured belongs here.
Open questions
- The review is from 2022. Have newer projects done better?
- Should direct air capture be a separate record?
- When most captured carbon goes to recovering more oil, is the tool failing at its purpose, or succeeding at a different one?
Notes
- Ivan Illich, Energy and Equity (London: Calder & Boyars, 1974), sec. “The Energy Crisis.” ↩︎
- Bruce Robertson and Milad Mousavian, “The Carbon Capture Crux: Lessons Learned,” Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, September 1, 2022, https://ieefa.org/articles/carbon-capture-decarbonisation-pipe-dream. ↩︎
Sources
- Illich, Ivan. Energy and Equity. Calder & Boyars, 1974.
- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage: Summary for Policymakers. Cambridge University Press, 2005. https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/srccs_summaryforpolicymakers-1.pdf.
- Robertson, Bruce, and Milad Mousavian. “The Carbon Capture Crux: Lessons Learned.” Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, September 1, 2022. https://ieefa.org/articles/carbon-capture-decarbonisation-pipe-dream.